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that "so long as there is no over-riding national purpose to be served,
nothing is gained by making federal enclaves thorns in the sides of
27
of
the States and barriers to the effective state-wide performance"
28
the police policy of the state.
Two solutions exist: (1) construe the Assimilative Crimes Act
to include "police regulations," or (2) cede jurisdiction to the state.
It is suggested that Congress might desirably cede jurisdiction to the
State for enforcement of police regulations within Federal areas. 29

CRIMINAL LAW
SELF INCRIMINATION
Defendant petitioner, Samuel Feldman, was convicted under a
federal statute, of fraudulently "kiting" checks through the mails.
Conviction affirmed. 2 Certiorari to determine whether the forced
admission in a federal court, of testimony previously given by him in
supplementary proceedings in a state court, 3 deprived him of the protection of the fifth Amendment.4 Held: affirmed. The admission of
testimony in the federal court, previously given by the accused in the
27.

28.

29.

1.
2.
3.

4.

Judge Murphy in dissent, continued, "Indeed both the federal government and the nation as a whole suffer if the solution of
legitimate matters of local concern is thus thwarted and local
animosity is created for no purpose." Pacific Coast Dairy, Inc.
v. Dept. of Agriculture of California, 318 U.S., 285, 305 (1943).
In a concurring dissent, Judge Frankfurter said, "Enough has
been said to show that the doctrine of 'exclusive jurisdiction' over
federal enclaves is not imperative. The phrase is indeed a misnomer for the manifold legal phases of the diverse situations
arising out of the existence of federally owned lands within a
state." Ibid., 300.
The police power of the state is an indispensable prerogative to
state sovereignty, and "at times the most insistent, and always
one of the least limitable powers of government." Eubank v.
Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 142 (1912); Classon v. Indiana, 306 U.S.
439 (1938); Ziffrin Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939).
"The possible importance of reserving to the state jurisdiction
for local purposes which involve no interference with the performance of governmental functions is becoming more and more
clear as the activities of the government expand and large areas
within the states are acquired." James v. Dravo Const. Co., 302
U.S. 134, (1937).
Congress has expressly ceded jurisdiction to the state over
federal enclaves for Workmen's Compensation Laws (Act of June
25, 1936, 49 Stat. 1938, 40 U.S.C.A. 290) and for enforcement of
state income, sales and use tax acts (the Buck Act of Oct. 9, 1940,
54 Stat. 1059, 4 U.S.C.A. 13-18).
35 Stat. 1130 (1009), 18 U.S.C.A. § 338 (1927).
136 F. (2d) 394 (C.C.A. 2d, 1943).
Feldman was called on as a witness in supplementary proceedings
designed to aid in the discovery of assets of a debtor. New York
Civil Practice Act, art. 45, § 789. New York immunity statute
protected him from further action in that state. New York Laws
1935, c. 630, § 789 as amended by New York Laws 1938, c. 108. § 17.
U.S. Const. Amend. V. "No person . . . shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
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state court, did not deprive accused of the protection of the fifth
Amendment, even though such testimony could not have been used
against him in a state prosecution. Feldman v. United States, 64 Sup.
Ct. 1082 (1944).3
Although the privilege of not incriminating oneself applies only
to the federal government,6 every state constitution, with two exceptions,7 contains a like provision. The provision protects a witness as
well as a party defendant. 8 It had its origin in protestation against
unjust inquisitorial methods of interrogating accused persons and the
building of a barrier for the people's protection against the exercise of
arbitrary power.9 Strangely enough, the privilege does not protect
against third-degree coercion,O although confessions of this kind are
voidable in two ways. 1'
Whether there is a privilege not to testify in a state court because
of fear of a federal criminal prosecution, is closely knit to the converse situation, whether there is a privilege not to testify in a federal
court because of fear of a state criminal prosecution. Regarding the
latter, in 1828 Chief Justice Marshall held, "The rule is, that a party
is not bound to make any discovery which would expose him to penalties and this case falls within it."'12 In 1896 the Supreme Court held
5.
6.
7.

8.
9.

10.

11.
12.

A 4-3 decision. Justices Black, Douglas, and Rutledge dissent.
Justices Murphy and Jackson took no part in the consideration
of this case.
Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (U.S. 1833). Nor is the privilege
included in the 14th Amendment. Twinning v. New Jersey, 211
U.S. 78 (1908).
Iowa and New Jersey. Iowa recognizes the rule of evidence with
reference to criminal procedure. State v. Knight, 117 Iowa 650,
91 N.W. 935 (1902). In New Jersey, it is recognized by the common law and by statute. State v. Zdanowicz, 69 New Jersey Law
619, 55 Atl. 743 (Ct. Errors and App., 1903).
McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924).
Contra: State v.
Douglass, 1 Mo. 527 (1825).
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596 (1896). Dean Wigmore attributes its origin largely to the efforts of one John Lilburn from
1637 to 1645. Wigmore, "The Privilege Against Self-Crimination;
Its History" (1902) 15 Harv. L. Rev. 610, 624. Pittman believes
that Puritans in New England are primarily responsible for the
establishment of the privilege in the United States, even before
1640. Pittman, "The Colonial and Constitutional History of the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America" (1935) 23 Va.
L. Rev. 763, 775.
A technical reason given is that the protection is available only
in a criminal prosecution and at the time when the third-degree
practice occurs there is as yet no criminal prosecution. Willis,
"Constitutional Law" (1935) 521. It seems peculiar that a defendant may be subjected to physical violence and that the privilege does not protect the very injustice for which it was designed.
For a good discussion of compulsory confessions, see Chafee, "The
Inquiring Mlind" (1928) 89.
Either on the grounds of duress or because of the privilege. Ziang
Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924); Note (1929) 43
Harv. L. Rev. 617.
United States v. Saline Bank of Virginia, 1 Pet. 100, 104 (U.S. 1828).
State v. March, 46 N.C. 526, 527 (1854) held the same rule in a
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the privilege not binding as the danger of a state prosecution was too
remote to be considered. 1 3 Since 1906 the view is held favoring the
famous "two sovereignities" rule. In granting immunity the only
danger to be guarded against is one within the same jurisdiction and
under the same sovereignty.14
Regarding the instant case and the privilege not to testify in a
state court because of fear of a federal prosecution, the development
appears simil4r to the other situation, but retarded. The original view
favored the extension of the privilege.15 In 1905 the Supreme Court
used the question of whether or not prosecution in another jurisdiction
appeared remote to decide the Jack case. 6 Suggested that the "two
sovereignties" rule was beginning to invade the field1 7 and this was
fostered by way of dictum in 1922.8 Again in 1931 "two sovereignsituation where courts of different states were involved. In Ballman v. Fagin, 200 U.S. 186, 195 (1906), Mr. Justice Holmes stated
the prevailing view that a witness before a federal grand jury need

not make "disclosures which would expose him to the penalties
of the state law" which punished gambling. Numerous other courts

adhered to the same rule in other criminal cases. In re Scott, 95
Fed. 815 (W.D. Penn. 1899); In re Feldstein, 103 Fed. 269 (S.D.
N.Y. 1000).
13. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
Other cases held likewise.
People v. Butler Street Iron and Foundry Co., 201 Ill. 236, 66
N.E. 349 (1903); State v. Jack, 69 Kan. 387, 76 Pac. 911 (1905).
Submitted that the court found an easy way to change the law
by merely holding the danger of prosecution in another court
"too remote."
14. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), McCalister v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 90 (1906).
This was a "clear acceptance of the 'two soyerigaties' doctrine rather than an application of the rule that
the danger of prosecution must be real and substantial." Grant,
"Immunity from Compulsory Self-Incrimination in a Federal System of Government" (1934) 9 Temp. L. Q. 194, 195. The "two
sovereignties" rule has since been the yardstick. United States v.
Murdock, 284 U.S. 140 (1931). It is interesting to note that Justice Brown wrote the opinion in the Henkel case, supra, only ten
years later than his opinion in the Brown case, Brown v. Walker,
161 U.S. 591 (1896), cited supra notes 9, 13. It appears that he
had changed his rationale during that time.
15. People v. Nussbaum, 55 App. Div. 245, 67 N.Y. Supp. 492 (1900).
16. Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372 (1905). The court relied heavily on
the converse situation and decision in the Brown case, Brown v.
Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896), cited supra notes 9, 13, 14. Justice
Peckham said in the Jack case, supra, at p. 382, " . . . such
possible prosecution did not operate as a reason for permitting
the witness to refuse to answer; that it could not be presumed that
under such circumstances any federal prosecution would ever take
place, and that it was, within the reasoning of Brown v. Walker,
supra, a danger so unsubstantial and remote that it was not necessary (or that it was impossible) for the statute to provide
against it."
17. The court said in Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372 (1905), cited supra
note 16, at page 382, "We think the legal immunity is in regard
to a prosecution in the same jurisdiction, and when that is given,
it is fully enough."
18. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922). This was a case involving double jeopardy which held that punishment by the Fed-
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ties" was followed.19 It is submitted that the principal case belatedly
follows this rule to a point not heretofore reached in that accused was
not contesting the validity of federal or state statutes granting him
immunity from prosecution in another jurisdiction, but only whether
federal courts could convict a defendant of a federal crime by use of
self-incriminating testimony gained from him against his will in a
state court.20 It appears that this standard continues to strip the constitutional privilege of much force in now both state and federal jurisa uniform rule, toward the end lo rg advocated by
dictions, giving us
2
many authorities. '
eral Government, after prosecution and punishment by the state,
was not double jeopardy under the 5th Amendment.
19. United States v. Smith, 51 F. (2d) 803 (S.D, Tex, 1931). The district judge stated that it was not even necessary to discuss authority to the effect that a state statue could no give immunity to
a defendant charged in a federal court with violation of a federal
criminal statute.
20. This holding would appear to be revolutionary to the other view
of the constitutional guaranty. Grant, "Self Incrimination in the
Modern American Law" (1931) 5 Temp. L. Q. Z68 says at 402,
Under the American federal system the abuses that the founding
fathers dreaded have found themselves a home, protected by the
magic phrase 'two soverignties'." Mr. Justice Bradley in Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 631 (1886) said that compulsory
self-incrimination is "contrary to the principles of fEree government.
It is abhorrent to the instincts of an American. It may suit the
purposes of despotic power, but it cannot abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty and personal freedom." Cooley said, "A
peculiar excellence of the common law system of trial over that
which has prevailed in other civilized countries is the fact that
the accused is never compelled to give evidence against himself."
Cooley, "Constitutional Limitations" (1868) 313. The English rule
is different from our rule. King in the Two Sicilies v. Wilcox, 7
State Trials (N.S.) 1050 (1851), modified by United States of
America v. McRae, L.R. 3 Ch. App. 79 (1867), probably established
the English law that the witness is protected as to crime cognizable not only by English but by foreign law, proxided the foreign
law is clearly proved or admitted. Grant, "Immunity from Compulsory Self-Incrimination In a Federal System of Government"
(1934) 9 Temp. L. Q. 57, 61.
21. Dean Wigmore said, "There is no reason why our profession should
not begin now to move in this reform." Wigmore, "Neno Tenetur
Seipsum Prodere" (1891) 5 Harv. L. Rev. 71, 88. Bentham called
the privilege "pretence for exclusion." Bentham, "Rationale of
Judicial Evidence," Pt. IV, e. III 7 Bowring's Ed. (1843) 451, 458.
Taft, "Administration of Criminal Law" (1905) 15 Yale L. J. 1,
also doubted the usefulness of the privilege as compared with
other needs of society. Boiarsky, "The Right of the Accused in a
Criminal Case Not to be a Witness against Himself" (1928) 35
W. Va., L. Q. 126, 143 says, "The privilege has ceased to be a
protection for the innocent. For an innocent marn, the sooner his
defense is raised the better. The privilege hat developed into
a means of escape for the guilty." Perhaps the best solution is
raised by Irvine, "The Third-Degree and Privilege against SelfIncrimination" (1927) 13 Corn. L. Q. 211, who contends that the
privilege is the cause of third-degree work and that if the courts
would narrow the privilege there would be less of the third-degree.

